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Decision outcomes sometimes result in negative emotions. This can occur
when a decision appears to be wrong in retrospect, and/or when the obtained
decision outcome does not live up to expectations. Regret and disappoint-
ment are the two emotions that are of central interest in the present article.
Although theseemotionshave a lot in common, theyalso differ in ways that are
relevant to decision making. In this article we review theories and empirical
® ndings concerningregret and disappointment. We ® rst discusshow regret and
disappointment differ with respect to their antecedent conditions, appraisals,
and phenomenology. We also discuss possible behavioural consequences of
experiencing these emotions. Next, we consider how the anticipation of regret
and disappointment may in¯ uence decision making. We use regret and dis-
appointment theory, developed by the economists Bell (1982, 1985), and
Loomes and Sugden (1982, 1986, 1987), as a framework for our discussion.
Finally, we argue that combining the theoretical approaches and research
paradigms of behavioural decision theory with emotion theories will signifi-
cantly increase our knowledge of antecedents and consequencesof emotions.
INTRODUCTION
A key element of most decisions is that they involve a certain degree of
uncertainty. We are often uncertain about future events; whether they will
take place, and if so, how we will evaluate them when they do take place.
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One way to cope with this uncertainty when making decisions is to form
expectancies about the possible outcomes of different courses of action,
and about how we would evaluate these if they were to occur. For example,
we might ask ourselves what would happen if we were to submit a paper to
a prestigious journal, and whether it might be better to opt for a journal
with a lesser reputation. These expectancies might help us to decide, and
hence give direction to our behaviour. Indeed, as Olson, Roese, and Zanna
(1996, p. 211) stated `̀ `expectancy’ forms the basis for virtually all beha-
vior’ ’ . Although our expectancies tend to be con® rmed most of the time (cf.
Olson et al., 1996), violations of expectancies are not uncommon. Negative
emotions often result when our current state of affairs is worse than
initially expected. In the context of decision making there are at least
two ways in which these violated expectancies can result in the experience
of negative emotions. The ® rst entails situations in which the chosen option
ends up being worse than the rejected options. This is the case when we
chose a certain course of action because we expected it to be the best, but it
turned out that another course of action would have been better. Following
these `̀ bad decisions’ ’ we are likely to experience regret. Second, the chosen
option can also result in an outcome that is worse than expected. Such
`̀ discon® rmed expectancies’ ’ often give rise to the experience of disappoint-
ment. These emotional reactions, and their relations with decision making,
are the focus of the present article.
Not surprisingly, regret and disappointment have attracted the attention
of decision researchers (for overviews see Gilovich & Medvec, 1995;
Landman, 1993; van Dijk, 1999; Zeelenberg, 1996). In the present paper
we discuss the psychology of these emotions. We attempt to demonstrate
how emotion theory can enhance our understanding of decision making,
and how decision theory can enhance our understanding of emotions. As
Frijda (1994, p. 118) pointed out: `̀Actual emotion, affective response,
anticipation of future emotion can be regarded as the primary course of
decisions’ ’ . In line with Frijda we focus on the conditions under which the
experience of regret and disappointment is felt in response to decision
outcomes, and on research showing that both the experience and the
anticipation of these emotions have an impact on our everyday decision
making.
We argue that regret and disappointment are different emotions, with
distinguishable consequences for decision making. At the same time we
appreciate that regret and disappointment have much in common with each
other: Both are negative emotions that are related to risky decision making
and uncertain outcomes, and both originate in a comparison process in
which the outcome obtained is compared to an outcome that might have
been. To develop our case we will focus on differences in the antecedents
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and experiences of regret and disappointment, and in the ways in which
they in¯ uence our behavioural decision making.
Regret and disappointment are different emotions
If one maintains, as we do, that regret and disappointment have distinctive
implications for decision making, it is important to establish that the terms
`̀ regret’ ’ and `̀ disappointment’ ’ refer to different emotions. Are regret and
disappointment really distinct emotions, or are they essentially similar sub-
jective states that, for some reason, go by different names? This question can in
turn be divided into two subquestions, namely: `̀ Do regret and disappoint-
ment have different antecedents?’ ’ and `̀ Do they feel different in terms of their
phenomenology?’ ’ We ® rst review research pertinent to the ® rst question.
In a recent series of studies we focused on the role of responsibility as an
antecedent of regret and disappointment (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, &
Manstead, 1998a). In these studies we manipulated the way in which
decision-makers arrived at a suboptimal outcome: This was either the
result of their own choice, or the result of a random procedure over which
they had no control. Greater regret was ascribed to those who were
responsible for the outcome (i.e. the choosers) than for those who were
not responsible. For disappointment the results were the reverse: More
disappointment was ascribed to the decision-maker when the negative
outcome was the result of a random procedure than when it resulted
from a choice. These results are consistent with Frijda, Kuipers, and ter
Schure (1989), who found that regret is more closely related to self-agency
than disappointment, whereas disappointment is more related to other-
agency than regret. This link between regret and responsibility may help to
explain why Gilovich and Medvec (1994, study 4), in a study of everyday
regrets, found so few regrets concerning negative outcomes that had been
imposed on people. Gilovich and Medvec asked people to recall their
biggest regrets. Less than 5% of these regrets involved outcomes caused
by circumstances beyond the regretter’s control.
The regret-responsibility relation also emerged in a separate study
investigating the patterns of appraisal associated with regret and disap-
pointment (van Dijk, van der Pligt, & Zeelenberg, 1998a). Participants
were asked to describe an occurrence of intense regret or disappointment
(or one of several other negative emotions, not discussed here). Next, they
were asked to report the appraisals that were made in these situations, on
eight dimensions (cf. Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996). There were
signi® cant differences on ® ve of these dimensions. Disappointment was
associated with higher scores on the dimensions of unexpectedness (cf.
Frijda et al., 1989), motivational state (wanting something pleasurable;
see also van Dijk, Zeelenberg, & van der Pligt, 1999), legitimacy (thinking
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that one was morally right) and circumstances agency (caused by circum-
stances beyond anyone’s control). Regret was associated with higher scores
on the dimensions of control potential (thinking that one could do some-
thing about the event), and self-agency. Regret and disappointment there-
fore seem to be associated with different appraisal patterns. Regardless of
whether appraisals are seen as causing emotions (e.g. Frijda et al., 1989;
Roseman et al., 1996), or as characterising them (Parkinson, 1997), apprai-
sals are regarded by most emotion theorists as a key component of
emotional experience. In this sense it could be argued that establishing
that regret and disappointment are associated with different patterns of
appraisal not only suggests differences in the antecedents of these
emotions; it also goes some way to answering the question of whether
the two emotions entail different experiences.
Another way of differentiating regret and disappointment as experiences
is to examine their phenomenology (Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). In a
recent study (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 1998b) we
asked participants to recall an instance of intense regret or disappointment,
and to indicate what they felt, thought, felt like doing, did, and wanted
during this experience (see Table 1 for the speci® c items used). These ® ve
aspectsÐ feelings, thoughts, action tendencies, actions, and emotivational
goalsÐ are assumed to be central components of an emotional experience
(see also Frijda, 1987; Plutchik, 1980). Roseman et al. (1994) have shown
that emotions can be differentiated on the basis of these components. The
results of our study, summarised in Table 1, reveal signi® cant differences
between regret and disappointment in each component. The differences were
most pronounced for action tendencies (what participants felt like doing
during the experience) and for emotivations (speci® c emotional motives or
goals that participants had during the experience). More speci® cally, we
found that the experience of regret could be differentiated from that of
disappointment in that the former involves feeling more intensely that one
should have known better, thinking about the possibility that one made a
mistake, feeling a tendency to kick oneself and to correct one’s mistake, and
wanting to undo the event and to get a second chance. We also found that the
experience of disappointment, more than that of regret, involves feeling
powerless, feeling and a tendency to do nothing and to get away from the
situation, actually turning away from the event, and wanting to do nothing.
Taken together, then, there is evidence that regret and disappointment
are associated with different antecedent conditions and different appraisal
patterns, and that they have different phenomenologies. Despite the fact
that these two emotions clearly have much in common, the ® ndings of the
studies reviewed earlier suggest that they also differ in important respects.
We interpret the evidence as showing that regret and disappointment are
different emotions.
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Behavioural consequences of experienced regret
and disappointment
How people cope with regret and disappointment, and how these emotions
in¯ uence decisions and behaviour, have not yet been the subject of much
empirical research. However, the ® ndings reviewed earlier provide some
leads with regard to how the two emotions in¯ uence decision making and
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TABLE 1
Means for each response item per emotion recalled (adapted from
Zeelenberg et al., 1998b)
Condition
Response Type and Item Regret Disappointment
Feelings
Feel a sinking feeling? 5.38 = 5.59
Feel powerless? 5.84 , 7.08
Feel that you should have known better? 7.32 . 5.75
Feel that you lost control? 5.97 = 6.27
Thoughts
Think about what a mistake you made? 7.09 . 5.51
Think about what you missed out on? 5.85 = 6.38
Think about a lost opportunity? 5.81 = 6.01
Think about how bad things could get? 5.01 = 5.23
Action Tendencies
Feel the tendency to kick yourself ? 7.11 . 5.16
Feel the tendency to get away from the situation? 5.47 , 6.16
Feel the tendency to correct your mistake? 6.80 . 4.89
Feel the tendency to do nothing? 3.36 , 4.14
Actions
Do something differently? 5.42 5 5.86
Turn away from the event? 4.54 , 5.23
Change the situation? 5.82 5 5.64
Become inactive? 3.75 5 4.05
Emotivational goals
Want to undo the event? 7.71 . 6.89
Want to be far away from what happened? 5.77 = 6.20
Want to get a second chance? 7.57 . 6.77
Want to do nothing? 2.97 , 3.63
Note: Bold printed response items were intended to measure the experience of
regret, the remaining items were intended to measure disappointment. Entries are
mean answers to the questions: `̀ When you felt regret [disappoinment], to what
extent did you feel/think/feel the tendency/did/want’’ followed by a response item.
Participants could answer on a 9-point scale, with endpoints labelled not at all (1)
and to a very great extent (9). Means separated by a , or . sign differ signi® cantly
(P , .05).
action. Because the experience of regret involves the tendency to kick
oneself, the tendency to correct one’s mistake, and the motivation to
undo the event, experienced regret should be associated with active
attempts to undo the unpleasant effects of the decisions that went
wrong. In a recent series of studies we focused on the behavioural undoing
of two kinds of regrets: those that stem from actions taken and those that
stem from actions foregone (Zeelenberg, van der Pligt, & Manstead,
1998c). Kahneman and Tversky (1982) were the ® rst to show that people
tend to regret actions with bad outcomes more than inactions with iden-
tical outcomes. In their study participants read about two stockbrokers,
one who decided to make a trade and another who decided not to. In the
end both stockbrokers lost a substantial amount of money. When asked
who regretted his decision most, virtually all participants responded by
identifying the one who had decided to act. This emotional ampli® cation
(cf. Kahneman & Miller, 1986) has been replicated in several studies (e.g.
Baron & Ritov, 1994; Connolly, OrdoÂ nÄ ez, Coughlan, 1997; Landman,
1986; Ritov & Baron, 1995; Zeelenberg et al., 1998a). Gilovich and Medvec
(1994) noted that these ® ndings do not ® t with the everyday observation
that people, when re¯ ecting on their own lives, tend to regret the things that
they did not do. In an extensive programme of research, they (Gilovich and
Medvec, 1994, 1995) showed that the experience of regret appears to
exhibit a temporal pattern, such that regrets over actions are more painful
in the short run, whereas regrets over inactions are more painful in the long
run. Consistent with these ® ndings, we (Zeelenberg et al., 1998c) found that
regrets over actions result in behavioural undoing more often and more
quickly than do regrets over inactions. This suggests a close link between at
least one type of regret and attempts at behavioural undoing.
Zeelenberg and Beattie (1997) investigated experimentally the impact of
experienced regret on subsequent decisions. Participants played the ulti-
matum game, a very simple game in which there are two players, a
proposer, and a responder. The proposer is endowed with a sum of
money, say 100 Dutch guilders, and offers a division of this money to
the responder (e.g. 25 guilders for you, 75 guilders for me). The responder
can then accept this offer, after which the two players receive the agreed
amount and the game ends; or the responder can reject the offer, after
which neither player receives any money and the game ends. In the
Zeelenberg and Beattie study all players were proposers; although they
thought they were interacting with other players, they were in fact playing
against a computer programme. After making their offer, participants
learned that it had been accepted. They also received feedback on how
much less they could have offered and still have their offer accepted.
Participants who could have offered 10 guilders less experienced more
regret than did participants who could have offered only 2 guilders less.
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When participants were asked to play a second round of the game (against
another responder), those who offered 10 guilders too much in the ® rst
round offered less money to the second responder than those who offered
only 2 guilders too much in the ® rst round. An analysis of covariance
revealed that these differences disappeared when regret was included as a
covariate. Thus, their second offer appeared to be in¯ uenced by the regret
experienced over the ® rst offer. Participants apparently engaged in a form
of emotion management, or more speci® cally regret management: They
behaved in such a way that their currently experienced regret would be
reduced and/or their future regret would be minimised.
In a study in which the behavioural consequences of regret and disap-
pointment were explicitly compared, distinct effects of both emotions were
found (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 1999). This study examined consumer
dissatisfaction with services. In one condition, dissatisfaction was caused
by the fact that, in retrospect, the consumer would have liked to have
chosen a different service provider; in another condition the obtained
service was worse than expected. Experienced regret and disappointment,
together with the behavioural responses in which the consumers engaged
were assessed. The analyses showed that the experience of disappointment
resulted in complaining to the service provider, and in talking to others
about the bad experience, whereas the experience of regret resulted in
switching to another service provider. Moreover, there was a tendency
for higher levels of regret to result in less talking to others about the
experience. These results are consistent with the notion that disappoint-
ment occurs in situations in which the person does not feel responsible for
the outcomeÐ but note that in this case the disappointing event can be
attributed to one or more other persons, instead of being attributed to
circumstances. The consumer will be inclined to complain to the person
who is responsible (the service provider), and to share the experience with
others (perhaps as a means of exacting some revenge on the service
provider, in the sense that others may be less inclined to buy his/her
services, and/or to obtain sympathy from others). Regretful consumers
are those who realise that there is a better option, and they switch to this
alternative service provider. Moreover, since they feel responsible for the
unsatisfactory outcome they tend to refrain from sharing it with others
(they are not likely to say to others: `̀ Look what a stupid choice I made’ ’ ).
Van Dijk (1999) examined the effects of experienced disappointment.
The ® ndings of this study, together with the results of research on the
experiential content of disappointment provide a reasonable basis for
predicting what the effects will be. Our research on the experiential con-
tent of disappointment shows that experiences of disappointment tend to
be accompanied by, among other things, feelings of powerlessness, and a
tendency to get away from the situation (Zeelenberg et al., 1998b). We
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suggest that the experience of disappointment will make people reluctant
to make subsequent decisions. Feelings of powerlessness might lead people
to think that making any decision at all will not make a difference, and
could therefore lead to inertia (Seligman, 1975). Furthermore, the tenden-
cies of people who experience disappointment to remove themselves from
the situation and to turn away from the event are likely to lead them to pay
attention to goals other than those that they were concerned with when
making the initial decision. These suggestions are consistent with van
Dijk’s (1999) ® ndings. Participants reported that when they are disap-
pointed they engaged in behaviours that entail `̀ doing something
different’ ’ to that which led to the disappointment. It has been argued
that disappointment signals the relationship between progress towards a
goal and expectations regarding one’s rate of progress (Carver & Scheier,
1990) and that it could have implications for energy investments and
ultimately for action termination or the abandonment of current goals
(Frijda, 1994). Thus, whereas regret is likely to result in a focus on non-
attained goals and promote goal persistence, disappointment may result in
goal abandonment.
We also expect experienced disappointment to result in increased risk
aversion. Risky options carry by de® nition a higher potential for disap-
pointment than do safer options. We suspect that when a decision-maker is
disappointed and engages in emotion management, he/she is not likely to
opt for choices that could result in even greater disappointment (i.e.
disappointed decision-makers are probably more sensitive to future disap-
pointments). They will therefore prefer safe alternatives.
The research reviewed in this section indicates that regret and disap-
pointment may have different consequences for how we cope with these
emotions. The ® ndings are not only consistent with the idea that regret and
disappointment have different antecedents and are different experiences;
they also follow from these differences. That is, the behavioural conse-
quences make sense if one takes account of how the emotion concerned
arises and how it feels to the person. For example, in the ultimatum game
study (Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997) participants offered less money in the
second round precisely because they regretted offering too much in the ® rst
round. Similarly, in the consumer behaviour study (Zeelenberg & Pieters,
1999) participants who were disappointed with a particular service com-
plained to the service provider, whereas those who regretted their choice
switched to another service provider. Thus it seems that the behavioural
consequences of the experienced emotions are closely related to a reduction
of the aversive experience. This shows that decision researchers interested
in the behavioural impact of emotions could pro® t from knowing more
about the antecedents and phenomenology of the emotions. However,
emotion researchers would also probably bene® t from paying closer atten-
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tion to the way in which decision theorists have examined the behavioural
effects of regret and disappointment. It is to this research that we turn next.
Regret and disappointment theories
The idea that regret and disappointment play a role in decision making is
by no means new (see e.g. Savage, 1954; Shand, 1914). However, it took
some time before the presumed effects became formalised. The economists
Bell (1982, 1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1982, 1986, 1987) indepen-
dently developed both a regret theory and a disappointment theory. These
theories assume that decision-makers experience emotions as a conse-
quence of making a decision. More importantly, it is assumed that deci-
sion-makers anticipate the experience of these emotions, and take them
into account when making decisions. Thus, according to these theories
decisions are partly based on regret and disappointment aversion (i.e. on
the tendency to make choices in such a way as to minimise the future
experiences of these negative emotions).
In these economic theories regret and disappointment are conceptua-
lised in different ways. The theories assume that there is a difference in the
source of comparison from which the two emotions arise. Although regret
and disappointment both stem from a comparison between `̀ what is’ ’
and’ ’what might have been’ ’ , regret is assumed to originate from compar-
isons between the factual decision outcome and a counterfactual outcome
that might have been had one chosen differently; disappointment is assumed
to originate from a comparison between the factual decision outcome and
a counterfactual outcome that might have been had another state of the
world occurred. This other state of the world is typically the expected state
of the world.1 This difference can be illustrated by the choice depicted in
Table 2, where the outcome of the two possible actions (A1 or A2) depends
on the occurrence of one of ® ve possible states of the world. According to
regret theory, an individual feels regret after having chosen action A1, and
state of the world S2 occurs. Regret occurs because the individual knows
that, given this state of the world, action A2 would have resulted in a better
outcome. According to disappointment theory, disappointment would be
felt, for example, if an individual chose action A2, and state of the world S5
were to occur. The outcome obtained in this combination ($50), is worse
than the majority of outcomes that would have occurred in another state of
the world. Note that although one would experience disappointment when
confronted with this outcome, one should not experience regret, because
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1
Note that the difference in responsibility for regret and disappointment, as discussed
earlier, is already implicit in this approach. We are typically responsible for our own
choices, but not for the state of the world that occurs.
the outcome of the rejected action is equally bad. Thus, decision outcomes
can produce emotional experiences when they are compared to foregone
outcomes.
We recently tested whether regret indeed follows from comparisons
between an obtained outcome and a counterfactual outcome that would
have been produced by another choice, and whether disappointment fol-
lows from comparisons between an obtained outcome and a counterfactual
outcome that would have been produced by a different state of the world
(for details see Zeelenberg et al., 1998d). In a ® rst study we asked people to
recall a regretful or a disappointing experience. When we asked them to
indicate in what way the situation could have been better, the regret
participants tended to focus on how things that were under their own
control (e.g. choices, behaviours) could have produced a better outcome,
whereas disappointment participants tended to focus more on things that
were not under their control (e.g. aspects of the situationÐ i.e. the state of
the world). In two further studies participants were confronted with a
detailed vignette describing a person who experiences a negative out-
come. There were various elements in the vignette that contributed to the
negative outcome, including the protagonist’s own choices and also
uncontrollable aspects of the situation. Participants were asked to
`̀ undo’ ’ the outcome, by focusing on either the controllable or the
uncontrollable features of the scenario. Focusing on behaviour resulted
in ampli® ed regret, whereas focusing on uncontrollable aspects of the
situation resulted in ampli® ed disappointment. These studies therefore
provide support for the assumptions in regret theory and disappointment
theory regarding the causes of the emotions.
However, most economists are not interested in the experience of emo-
tions per se, but rather in how they shape our behavioural choices. This is
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TABLE 2
Outcomes of actions A1 and A2 for each possible state of the
world (S1± S5)
States of the World
Actions S1(20%) S2(20%) S3(20%) S4(20%) S5(20%)
A1 $250 $100 $100 $0 $50
A2 $0 $250 $100 $100 $50
Note: This table depicts a choice between actions, A1 and A2, for
which the outcomes depend on the speci® c state of the world that
occurs. There are ® ve different states of the world. Each state of the
world has a 20% probability of occurrence. Thus, the outcome at
which a decision-maker arrives depends both on his/her choice, and
on the state of the world that occurs.
also true of regret and disappointment theories. In these theories it is
assumed that the emotions in¯ uence the utility that is derived from an
obtained outcome, or in other words, the valuation of that outcome. In
similar studies, Inman, Dyer, and Jia (1997) and Taylor (1997) invited
participants to make decisions and manipulated the outcomes of the
chosen and unchosen options. They found that the valuation of the
obtained outcome was both in¯ uenced by how the outcome of the chosen
option compared to the previously held expectations (a proxy for disap-
pointment) and by how it compared to the outcome of the unchosen
option (a proxy for regret). These studies therefore provide support for
the assumption that regret and disappointment can affect the utility of an
outcome.
The central idea in regret and disappointment theories is that possible
future emotions are taken into consideration when determining the
expected utility of different courses of action. In this way anticipated
emotional reactions to decision outcomes can in¯ uence current decision
making. Note that the way in which these anticipated emotions, as con-
ceptualised in these decision theories, in¯ uence decision making differs
quite markedly from the in¯ uence of experienced emotions, which are
more typically the focus of emotion researchers. The effects of anticipated
regret or disappointment are different because decision-makers do not have
to experience the emotions in order to be in¯ uenced by them. Rather, they
can predict the emotional consequences of different decision outcomes in
advance, and opt for the choices that minimise the possibility of negative
emotions.
In what follows we combine regret and disappointment theories’ notions
of anticipated regret and disappointment into a general decision theory of
anticipated emotions. Expected utility theory is a normative theory of
decision making in which it is assumed that decision-makers weigh the
possible outcomes of an action and assign utilities to them. These utilities
are weighted by the perceived probabilities of the outcomes. Expected
utility theory does not take into account the possible regret and disap-
pointment that may be felt as a consequence of decision outcomes. A
version of expected utility theory that includes anticipated regret and
disappointment would be the following.2
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2
This equation is a conceptual integration of Loomes and Sugden’s (1982, 1986) and Bell’s
(1982, 1985) theories about anticipated regret and disappointment. Inman et al. 1997)
present a similar integration of these ideas (see also Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, and Ritov,
1997; Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, in press). Our present approach is different in that it
focuses on the effects of the pre-decisional anticipation of these emotions on choice, whereas
Inman et al. focus more on the effects of the post-decisional experience of these emotions on
the post-choice valuation of options.
Generalised Expected Utility [A1] 5 Expected Utility [A1]
6 Regret 6 Disappointment (1)
In eq (1) the generalised expected utility of action A1 in Table 2 would
be considered to be equal to its traditional expected utility, corrected for
the possible regret and disappointment associated with that action. The
`̀ Expected Utility[A1]’ ’ term thus stands for the traditional expected utility
of A1: S U 3 P[A1], a sum of the utilities of each outcome of A1 ($250,
$100, $100, $0, and $50) weighed by their probability of occurrence (.20 for
each outcome).
The `̀ Regret’ ’ term in eqn(1) represents the extent to which the possible
regret is taken into account, and can be formalised as follows: w 1( S RI 3
RP[A1o 2 A2o]). RI (Regret Intensity) represents the intensity of the possible
regret that stems from comparing the outcome realised by action A1 (=
A1o) with the outcome that would be realised when action A2 (= A2o) was
chosen. RP (Regret Probability) represents the probability with which this
particular regret occurs. For example, RI would be 2 150 when S2 occurs,
because in this case the chosen action A1 provides a gain of $100, whereas
A2 would have provided a gain of $250, and 100 2 250 5 2 150. RP would
in this case be .20 (all ® ve states of the world in Table 2 have a probability of
20%). RI can also be positive (i.e. it can also represent rejoicing over the
decision). This would be the case when S1 occurs. Here the decision-maker
not only gains $250, but also experiences `̀ positive regret’ ’ (i.e. rejoicing)
because A2 would have resulted in a much worse outcome ($0). The regret
term is 0 when the two actions would have resulted in the same outcome. In
our example, this would be the case if S3 or S5 occurs. The multiplication and
summation of all RIs and RPs represent the `̀ expected regret’ ’ . The weight
assigned to the expected regret is represented by w 1. This weight re¯ ects the
importance of the role played by expected regret in this particular decision.
The value of w 1 will depend on the personality of the decision-maker (i.e. for
those who are dispositionally averse to regret, w 1 will be higher), and on
situational factors (i.e. the importance of the decision, the extent to which
feedback is expected, etc.; see Zeelenberg 1999). Finally, w 1 will be higher
for regret than for rejoicing, re¯ ecting a tendency for regret aversion to
have a greater impact than rejoice seeking (cf. Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der
Pligt, & de Vries, 1996), which is consistent with Kahneman and Tversky’s
(1979) conclusion that losses loom larger than gains.
The same applies to the anticipation of disappointment. The `̀ Disap-
pointment’ ’ term in eqn(1) represents extent to which the possible disap-
pointment is taken into account, and could be formalized as follows: [ w 2( S
DI 3 DP[A1o 2 A1exp.]]. DI represents the intensity of the possible disap-
pointment that stems from comparing the outcome realised by action A1
with the expectation for that action. The expectation can either be the
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mathematical expectation (i.e. .20 3 $250 1 .20 3 $100 1 .20 3 $100 1 .20
3 $0 1 .20 3 $50 5 $125), or one of the speci® c other outcomes that could
be realised given that the same choice was made. DP represents the
probability with which this particular disappointment occurs. Thus, for
example, if after having chosen action A1 state of the world S2 were to
occur, one might feel disappointed because the outcome is less than
expected, or because one compares the obtained $100 to the $250 that
would have been obtained had S1 occurred. These comparisons of out-
comes produced by different states of the world given a certain choice can
also result in elation, the positive counterpart of disappointment. This
would be the case if S1 were to occur. There would be no disappointment
or elation if the outcome obtained was equal to the expectation. The
multiplication and summation of all DIs and DPs represent the
`̀ expected disappointment’ ’ . The weight assigned to the expected disap-
pointment is represented by the w 2 in eqn(1). This weight re¯ ects the
importance of expected disappointment in this particular decision. The
value of w 2 is again seen as depending on the personality of the deci-
sion-maker and on situational factors, and w 2 will be higher for disap-
pointment than for elation, re¯ ecting the fact that the tendency to avoid
disappointment is stronger than the tendency to seek elation.
Substituting the above in eqn (1) results in the following:
Generalised EUA1 5 S U 3 P [A1] 6 w 1( S RI 3 RP[A1o 2 A2o])
6 w 2( S DI 3 DP[A1o 2 A1exp.]). (2)
Thus, the core idea in these decision theories about anticipated emotions
is that decision-makers not only seek to maximise their traditional
expected utility, but also tend to avoid negative post-decisional emotions,
such as regret and disappointment, and to strive for positive emotions, such
as rejoicing and elation. Thus, in the example shown in Table 2 the
decision-maker has to come to terms with the fact that either choice
exposes him/her to the possibility of regret and disappointment. The
anticipation of these emotions may result in a preference for option A1
or option A2, whereas expected utility theory would predict indifference
because the expected utilities of the two choices are identical. In the
following, we describe empirical research supporting the claim that the
anticipation of regret and disappointment in¯ uences decision making.
Effects of anticipated regret and disappointment on
decision-making processes
There remains the question of how these anticipated emotions in¯ uence
decisions. The formulas described in the previous section provide a struc-
tural approach to the effects of anticipated emotions, but this approach
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remains mute with respect to how this in¯ uence occurs on a psychological
level. We suggest that decision-makers can employ several different strate-
gies in order to anticipate or avoid future regret and disappointment. First,
people may simply avoid making decisions, that is they can become
decision-averse (Beattie, Baron, Hershey, & Spranca, 1994). Making no
decision prevents both regret and disappointment, because one simply
cannot make the `̀ wrong’ ’ decisions or experience outcomes that fall
below expectancies. However, such a strategy is not likely to be useful,
because most situations require a decision. Moreover, there may be long-
term disadvantages to decision-avoidance, because in the long-run we may
well regret our inactive decision attitude (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995).
Second, people may delay their decision making. Delaying a decision
also postpones acquiring feedback about the outcome of the decision,
and thereby prevents the experience of regret or disappointment. This
strategy has the same disadvantage as making no decision. However,
delaying a decision might be bene® cial in preventing regret. One of the
aversive things about regret is that people who experience regret have a
feeling that they should have known better. Delaying a decision might be
helpful in escaping this feeling, if the delay is used to gather all information
relevant to the decision, with a view to making better decision. If every-
thing has been taken into account, there is less likelihood that one will
think that one should have known better, and therefore less likelihood of
regret.
The two strategies described earlier can be used to avoid both regret and
disappointment. Next, we describe strategies that can be used either to
avoid regret or to avoid disappointment. As regret stems from comparisons
between outcomes of different options, decision-makers can try to avoid
regret by avoiding feedback about nonchosen options. This tendency to
avoid feedback regarding foregone outcomes can promote both risk-
avoiding and risk-seeking tendencies (Zeelenberg, 1999). Which tendency
prevails depends on whether the risk-seeking or risk-avoiding tendency
avoids feedback on foregone outcomes. Zeelenberg et al. (1996) found
that when participants were given a choice between a risky and a safe
gamble, those who expected to receive feedback on the safe option, regard-
less of their choice, were likely to choose this safe option. They thereby
protected themselves from potentially threatening feedback on the fore-
gone outcome. Likewise, those who expected to receive feedback on the
risky option tended to choose the risky option. A substantial body of
research focuses on the effects of the anticipation of regret on decision-
making. It has been found that regret in¯ uences decision-making in the
context of lotteries (Josephs, Larrick, Steele, & Nisbett, 1992; Ritov, 1996;
Zeelenberg et al., 1996), investment decisions (Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997),
negotiations (Larrick & Boles, 1995; Zeelenberg & Beattie, 1997), consu-
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mer choice in the context of both products and services (Inman & Zeelen-
berg, 1998), whether to take advantage of a special sales promotion (Inman
& McAlister, 1994; Simonson, 1992), whether to engage in unsafe sex
(Richard, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996), and whether to engage in
unsafe driving behaviour (Parker, Stradling, & Manstead, 1996). All these
studies provide evidence consistent with the idea that anticipated regret
in¯ uences behavioural choice. However, there are also some studies that
have failed to ® nd this effect (for a review see Zeelenberg, 1999).
Although disappointment theory (Bell, 1985; Loomes & Sugden, 1986)
states that people take disappointment into account when making deci-
sions, there has been virtually no empirical research focusing speci® cally on
the effects of disappointment on decision making. We suggest that, as with
regret, people can employ several strategies in order to avoid feeling
disappointment. Disappointment stems from discon® rmed expectancies,
so in order to avoid disappointment one’s expectancies concerning deci-
sion outcomes need to be in line with the obtained outcomes of the
decision. Hence, if one has to take a decision, avoiding risk is a simple
way of avoiding disappointment. Opting for safe alternatives, leading to
outcomes that are known in advance to occur with certainty, does not carry
the risk of disappointment. In such cases, the outcome equals the expecta-
tion, precluding the possibility of disappointment. Outcomes of riskier
options may fall short of the expectation level, and thereby give rise to
disappointment (van Dijk & van der Pligt, 1997). Risk aversion, then, is a
way of avoiding disappointment. However, this strategy may sometimes
enhance the likelihood that regret will be experienced, as noted earlier.
Another way of avoiding disappointment is by trying to live up to one’s
initial expectations (cf. Armor & Taylor, 1998). The motivation to avoid
disappointment may prompt the individual to intensify his/her efforts in
order to avoid the possibility of a negative outcome (cf. Averill, 1968). In
other words, people may try harder to attain a desired outcome. Investing
effort will generally increase the probability of attaining a desired outcome,
and therefore decrease the probability of getting disappointed.
A further means of avoiding disappointment is also based on the
relation between expectancies and disappointment. Feather (1967, 1969)
suggested that people perceive unexpected negative outcomes as more
aversive than expected negative outcomes. Thus, when an outcome is
unfavourable, the lower one’s initial expectations, the less one’s dissatisfac-
tion with the actual outcome. When people are faced with uncertainty
regarding the occurrence of a desirable outcome, they may attempt to
avoid the disappointment that would occur if the outcomes are not
obtained by underestimating their chances of obtaining the outcomes in
question. That is, people may avoid getting their hopes up when desirable
but uncertain outcomes are at stake. The lower one’s expectations, the less
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likely it is that they will be higher than the obtained outcome, and the
likelihood of disappointment is correspondingly lower.
There is some research showing that people do indeed employ a strategy
of lowering expectancies when anticipating future disappointment
(Loewenstein & Linville, 1986; Nisan, 1972; Pyszczynski, 1982;
Shepperd, Ouellette, & Fernandez, 1996; van Dijk et al., 1998b; see also
Cantor & Norem, 1989, on the issue of defensive pessimism). Although
lowering expectancies is likely to eliminate negative feelings about a poor
outcome, it might more speci® cally eliminate disappointment stemming
from an unexpectedly unfavourable outcome. For example, van Dijk et al.
(1998b) had psychology students take a test that was described as predic-
tive either for a career as a psychologist or for a career as a lawyer. Students
were asked to give performance estimates directly after completing the test
and again just before they were to receive feedback about their perfor-
mance. Consistent with previous research (e.g. Shepperd et al., 1996),
participants lowered their expectations when they were closer to learning
the (possibly disappointing) result of the test. Interestingly, they did this
only when the outcome really would have been disappointing (i.e. when the
test they had taken was predictive for their career as a psychologist).
Lowering expectations in the sense of likelihood is not the only way in
which people might try to avoid disappointment. Pyszczynski (1982)
argued that when a person fears that he/she will not obtain a highly
desired outcome, one way of preparing for this possibility is to convince
oneself that the outcome is really not so desirable after all. By derogating
the desired but uncertain outcome, one reduces the negative affect that
would result if the outcome is not obtained. Results of this study are
consistent with this reasoning. Participants derogated a prize when their
chances of winning were low, but only when the prize was high in attrac-
tiveness. Apparently, people employ this protective strategy only when the
potential for future negative affect is relatively high (i.e. when a highly
attractive outcome is at stake). Yet another way of avoiding disappoint-
ment has been suggested by Armor and Taylor (1998). They argue that
setting less speci® c expectations can be a way of avoiding disappointment,
because vague expectations are harder to discon® rm. Armor and Taylor
found that people’s overly optimistic expectations for success were asso-
ciated with greater disappointment following performance, but only when
these expectations were speci® c and thus potentially veri® able.
Summarising, these are several strategies for avoiding disappointment.
Individuals can try to live up to their initial expectations by investing more
effort, they can strategically lower the likelihood of obtaining a desired
outcome, they can derogate the attractiveness of a desired outcome, or they
can set global expectations that are hard to discon® rm. In sum, regret and
disappointment theories assume that decision-makers base their decisions
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partly on the emotions that they anticipate experiencing in reaction to the
decision outcomes. The research reviewed earlier provides evidence in
keeping with this assumption. Although there is more empirical support
concerning the effects of regret, there are good theoretical grounds for
expecting clear effects of disappointment.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The research reviewed in the present paper shows that regret and disap-
pointment are different emotions. They arise from different antecedent
conditions and are associated with different appraisals. Regret typically
arises in situations where one is, or feels, responsible for the occurrence of a
negative event. Disappointment is typically experienced in response to
unexpected negative events that were caused by uncontrollable circum-
stances, or by another person. Regret and disappointment also differ in
their phenomenology, and have distinctive behavioural consequences.
Regret is associated with a tendency to blame oneself for having made
the wrong decision, a focus on the regretted event with a view to undoing it
or preventing it from happening again in the future. Moreover, regret often
results in reparative action. Because of self-blame, regret is probably the
more intense of the two emotions, but it is also the one that promotes
learning from one’s mistakes and it may therefore be a more `̀ functional’ ’
emotion. Disappointment is an emotion that results in feeling powerless
and inactive. It may be paralysing because it is often not clear how one
could have avoided the disappointment or what one could do about it when
it is experienced. However, when another person is responsible for the
disappointing event, as in the consumer dissatisfaction study (Zeelenberg
& Pieters, 1999) reviewed earlier, disappointment may result in active
attempts to overcome the disappointment. We suspect that this person-
related disappointment is often associated with feelings of anger, whereas
the more common outcome-related disappointment is associated with
feelings of sadness (cf. van Dijk et al., 1998a). Finally, as suggested by
regret and disappointment theories, these emotions can be anticipated, and
thereby exert an in¯ uence on decisions before they are actually experi-
enced. Anticipated regret promotes choices that shield one from painful
feedback on foregone options, and is assumed to promote information
search and elaborated decision processes. Anticipated disappointment
may result in trying to live up to an initial expectation or in strategically
lowering ones expectations, so that discon® rmation of expectations is less
likely.
An important implication of these ® ndings is that there is a need to be
speci® c about the emotion under investigation when researching the influ-
ence of emotions on decision making (see also van der Pligt, Zeelenberg,
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van Dijk, de Vries, & Richard, 1998c; van Dijk et al., 1999; Zeelenberg &
Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg et al., 1998a). As the present review suggests,
even closely related emotions such as regret and disappointment have
distinctive effects on choice behaviour. These in¯ uences are best under-
stood when there is knowledge about the antecedents and phenomenology
of the emotions. It is therefore of critical importance for decision research-
ers to focus not only on decisional consequences of (anticipated) emotions,
but also on the processes that mediate these consequences.
A further implication is that, in addition to the variables measured in
traditional emotion research, emotions can be differentiated on the basis of
their behavioural consequences or the consequences arising from the
anticipation of emotions. Here, emotion researchers can bene® t from
adopting a decision-making perspective. Decision researchers have tradi-
tionally focused on the effects of variables on behavioural choice, and the
present review shows how some of their paradigms can be useful in
differentiating emotions.
In conclusion, we favour the integration of theories, paradigms, and
® ndings from decision research and emotion research, and we believe that
there are many interesting research questions that would be addressed more
effectively by such a combined approach than by either ® eld on its own. One
such question concerns the dynamics of emotion-behaviour interaction. It
would be interesting to study how behavioural decisions and their outcomes
in¯ uence appraisal processes, which in turn result in the labelling and
experience of an emotion (e.g. as regret or disappointment), and how
behavioural attempts to cope with the emotion may affect the emotion
either directly or result in a reappraisal of the emotion-eliciting situation.
Investigating these dynamics should further our understanding of both
decision processes and the dynamics of emotional experiences.
Manuscript received 22 June 1999
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